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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4398
___________
MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS,
Appellant
v.
DAVID EBBERT, Warden
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-02164)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 15, 2011

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 27, 2011 )
___________
OPINION
___________

PER CURIAM
Michael Curtis Reynolds, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the
District Court’s order denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For
the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I.
In 2007, Reynolds was convicted of multiple terrorism-related offenses and
sentenced by the District Court to 360 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised
release. The court also imposed a special assessment of $500. We affirmed that
judgment on direct appeal. See United States v. Reynolds, 374 F. App’x 356, 358 (3d
Cir. 2010).
In October 2010, Reynolds filed a pro se habeas petition in the District Court
pursuant to § 2241. The petition did not challenge the legality of Reynolds’s conviction
or sentence. Rather, it alleged only that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) had violated his
rights by issuing a “restitution payment schedule.” (See Habeas Pet. 1.) In support of
this claim, Reynolds maintained that “only a District Court may set a payment schedule
for any fine, fee, or restitution.” (Id. at 3.) On October 28, 2010, the District Court,
acting sua sponte, denied the petition as meritless. In doing so, the court found that
Reynolds had not been ordered to pay restitution or a fine, and concluded that the BOP
could indeed establish a payment schedule for collecting the $500 special assessment.
This appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 In reviewing
the denial of a § 2241 petition, “[w]e exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
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Because we agree with the District Court that Reynolds’s habeas petition was
properly brought under § 2241, he does not need to obtain a certificate of
appealability to proceed with this appeal. See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d
256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.” See
O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Having
considered Reynolds’s arguments, and for substantially the reasons set forth in the
District Court’s opinion, we agree with the Court’s decision to deny his habeas petition
on the merits. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
III.
We write further here to address the numerous filings that Reynolds has submitted
to this Court since initiating this appeal. In these filings, he claims that prison officials at
the Federal Correctional Institution at Allenwood in Pennsylvania — his current place of
confinement — have retaliated against him, interfered with his access to the courts, and
otherwise mistreated him. He seeks, inter alia, a temporary restraining order prohibiting
this conduct.
Reynolds’s requests for relief are hereby denied without prejudice, as his claims
are not properly before this Court. To the extent he wishes to pursue these claims, he
should file a complaint in the District Court. We note, however, that Reynolds, a
frequent litigator in the federal courts, has “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Accordingly, to file a complaint in the District Court, he must either pay the filing fee in
full or demonstrate that he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g). We express no opinion on his ability to meet the imminent danger
standard or prevail on the merits of his claims.
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